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Abstract: Preserving invariants while designing distributed applications under weak consistency
models is difficult. The CEC (Correct Eventual Consistency Tool) is meant to aid the application
designer in this task. This report presents some specifications tried out using the tool and some
recommendations for its improvement based on the usage experience.
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Évaluation de l’outil CEC (Correct Eventual Consistency)
pour la vérification des applications à cohérence à terme
Résumé : Le maintien des invariants, dans les applications réparties s’exécutant dans un
modèle de cohérence faible, est un problème difficile. L’outil CEC (Correct Eventual Consistency)
est destiné à aider le développeur d’application dans cette tâche. Notre rapport présente plusieurs
exemples de spécifications vérifiées en utilisant cet outil, ainsi que quelques recommandations sur
son usage, basées sur notre expérience d’utilisation.
Mots-clés : cohérence, vérification, applications distribuées
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1 Introduction
The Correct Eventual Consistency (CEC) Tool is based on CISE logic developed by Gotsman
et al.[1]. CISE logic provides reasoning on the correctness of a distributed application operating
on top of a causally consistent database. According to the logic, a distributed application is
guaranteed to uphold the invariant if each operation is sequentially correct, each operation is
stable under the precondition of the other and the operations commute. The assumption of CISE
logic is that the application is designed on top of a database layer which ensures causal delivery
of updates.
The input to the tool is a specification written in the intermediate verification language,
Boogie[2], with some annotations required by the tool. The tool performs verification checks
on the specification and provides recommendations for synchronization. This report summarizes
the evaluation of the tool in terms of ease of use.
We take an example of a simple decrement counter to illustrate the usage of the tool. First we
show how to write a specification for a decrement counter normally used in sequential applica-
tions. We discuss the result given by the tool in terms of the synchronization recommendations.
Then we will go to a better example by designing a counter with escrow. The tool gives some
recommendations here as well. As a third step we specify a bounded counter CRDT and examine
the result of the tool. We also show an example of a replicated growable array specification using
the tool.
The report concludes with our recommendations to enhance the usability of the tool and a
discussion on the possible future research and development directions for the tool.
2 Correct Eventual Consistency tool
Based on the CISE logic, a tool was developed and reported by Najafzadeh et al.[3]. As the
authors have pointed out, the CISE tool is difficult to use since the user would need to study
Z3 APIs in order to use it[4]. Marcelino et al.[5] has designed the CEC tool which works on the
same principle and uses Boogie [2] with some annotations. The language except the annotations
is specified by Leino[6]. The annotations are specific to this tool.
A specification consists of the following parts:
• Data structures and properties
• Variables
• Invariants
• Operations with pre and post conditions
The verification is done in two main steps :- specification correction and consistency verifica-
tion. For each check, a boogie file is generated by the tool using the input specification. Boogie
is invoked using these files and the output is examined to determine the status of the check.
The specification correction section checks whether
• each individual component of the specification is correct syntactically (syntax check)
• each operation satisfies the invariant individually (safety check)
• there is any contradictory clause in the specification (anomaly check)




The analysis will proceed onto the consistency verification stage only if all the specification
correction checks are passed. According to the event based proof rule described by Gotsman
et al.[1], this stage ensures that the consistency of the specification upholds the application
invariants. In a distributed application, each operation would be propagated from the replica
which it originated from(origin replica) to all other replicas. That means, now the specificatin
is sequentially correct at the origin replica.
The consistency verification section checks the pair of operations to see whether
• the pair of operations have opposing preconditions (opposition check)
• the precondition of one operation holds under the other operation (stability check)
• the pair of operations commute (commutativity check)
The ones that fail the opposition check do not need to be analysed further as they will never
be executed concurrently. The second and third check in the consistency verification stage deals
with the safety of concurrent operations. In case these checks fail, a token generation engine
is invoked to generate concurrency tokens for ensuring safety. Currently, the token generator
checks whether enforcing inequality on the input parameters would make the specification safe.
3 Examples
This section describes several examples tried using CEC tool. Each example is provided with
a brief description on the context and the specification is explained. The complete sepcification
of each example along with the tokens and the output from the tool is shown in the appendix.
The specification of each example is examined in four parts:





Decrement counter is a count down counter with a lower bound. It is an integer which has
increment and decrement operations. The specification can be examined as per the CEC tool
input format.
• Data structure and properties
The data structure is int , which is a native datatype supported by Boogie. A constant
named min is defined to specify the lower bound which the counter must respect.
• Variables
There is a single variable here, named counter , which is of type int .
• Invariants
The only invariant is that the value of the counter should not be less than min .
• Operations
The operations and the pre and post conditions are as follows:
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– increment
This function is used to increment counter by value units. The only precondition for
this operation is that the value by which the counter should be incremented should
be positive.
– decrement
This function is used to decrease the value of counter by value units. The precondition
for this operations is that value should be positive and the current value of the counter
is more than min + value .
When we run the CEC tool with this specification, the tool indicates that for sequential
applications it works perfectly fine. For the consistency tests, the tool shows that the precondition
of decrement operation is not stable under the effect of another decrement operation.
For example, consider a scenario where counter was having a value of 5. The value of min
is specified as 0. This means counter cannot decrease beyond 0. Now consider an operation
decrement(3) . This operation when done in a sequential program satisfies the invariant. But
if the same operation with the same parameter is executed at two different replicas, when the
changes are propagated, the value of counter becomes -1, which violates the invariant. So once
the operation is executed with the given parameter, a second operation is not possible, because
it does not fulfill the precondition. This is the output of the tool. The tool also generates a token
indicating that the decrement operation needs strong coordination. The format of the token is
as shown below:
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
decrement : decrement_all
Token c o n f l i c t s :
decrement_all : decrement_al l
This also means that the increment operation can be executed without any synchronization. In
short, the tool points out the functions which would require synchronization and the application
designer needs to implement it.
As we have seen, the decrement operation needs strong synchronization. So if a replica wants
to perform a decrement , it should acquire a token which locks the counter for any decrement
operation. We declare a global variable called lock of datatype ReplicaID which is to be acquired
by any replica that needs to perform a decrement operation. We also specify the restriction stating
that the decrement function should not originate from the same replica twice, which is based on
the fact that causal delivery is ensured by the underlying database.
This leads to an application being unavailable to a user when another user needs to perform
the decrement operation.
3.2 Decrement counter with escrow
In the counter described in the previous section, the locking happens for all decrement opera-
tions irrespective of the value of the counter and the value to be decremented. To overcome this
drawback, the concept of escrow transactional model [7] is used to divide the rights for decre-
menting the counter between replicas. Najafzadeh [4] provides a specification for this counter
which we reuse here. The specification is as follows:
• Data structures and properties




The two variables used are localCredit for each replica and globalCredit which is a shared
variable.
• Invariants
The localCredit for all replicas and globalCredit should be always non-negative.
• Operations The four operations are defined as follows:
– increment
This operation increases the local credits of the local replica. The parameters to this
operation are the replica , which is the ReplicaID of the local replica and k , the local
credits to be added. The only precondition for the operation is that k should be
positive.
– decrement
This operation is the inverse of the increment operation. It decreases the local credits
of the local replica. The parameters to this operation are replica and k , the amount
of local credits consumed. The preconditions for the operation is that k should
be positive and the local replica should have sufficient local credits. The operation
ensures that the local credits of replica is decreased by k .
– acquireCredit
This operation acquires some credit from the globalCredit and adds it to the localCredit
of the replica. The parameters are similar to the previous operations. The precondi-
tion of the operation is that there should be sufficient globalCredit for the operation.
The operation ensures k credits to be acquired by the local replica from globalCredit .
– releaseCredit
This operation releases the localCredit of replica to globalCredit . The parameters are
the same as previous operations with the precondition that the replica has sufficient
localCredit . The operation transfers credits from the replica to the globalCredit .
This specification is run against the CEC tool and the tool suggests that the precondition of
the following pair of operations are not stable under another execution of the other.
• acquireCredit - acquireCredit
• releaseCredit - releaseCredit
• releaseCredit - decrement
• decrement - decrement
The tokens generated are as follows:
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
decrement : decrement_param1
r e l e a s eC r ed i t : re leaseCredit_param1
acqu i r eCred i t : a cqu i r eCred i t_a l l
Token c o n f l i c t s :
decrement_param1 : decrement_param1 , re leaseCredit_param1
acqu i r eCred i t_a l l : a cqu i r eCred i t_a l l
re leaseCredit_param1 : decrement_param1 , re leaseCredit_param1
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The restrictions which should be imposed here are that none of the pairs originate from the
same replica. This makes sense since the CISE logic assumes causal delivery of updates.
This model requires locking only when acquireCredit function is called. We implement a lock
similar to the decrement counter in the previous section and add an extra precondition to the
acquireCredit function that the lock must be acquired. The tool is now run against the modified
specification along with the restrictions and it shows a failure of the pair opposition test for a
pair of acquireCredit operations. This makes sense as two acquireCredit operations originating
from different replicas cannot run concurrently anymore. This design makes the application more
available as the counter can operate seamlessly until each replica has enough local rights.
3.3 Decrement counter CRDT
The bounded counter[8] is a conflict-free replicated datatype (CRDT)[9] which helps to ensure
numerical invariants. It is similar to the counter with escrow, but has a different implementation
which takes the synchronization off the critical path. Balegas et al.[8] specify the design of a state-
based CRDT. Instead the specification which we propose below is written as an operation-based
CRDT. The specification is for a counter which has a lower bound.
• Data structures and properties
The two datatypes defined are matrix2d and matrix1d for 2-dimensional and 1-dimensional
matrices respectively. replicas indicate the number of replicas involved and min is the
minimum value the counter should maintain. The matrices R (storing the information of
the rights) and U (storing usage information) have dimensions replicas × replicas and
replicas × 1 respectively. value and local_rights are computed as per the specification
explained by Balegas et al.[8].
• Invariants
The value of the counter should be always greater than or equal to the min value specified.
• Operations with pre and post conditions
The three effector functions defined are as follows:
– increment
Increment operation takes two parameters
∗ id - the origin replica
∗ n - the new value of R[id ][ id ] at the origin replica
The prerequisite for the operation is simple, it has to be in a participating replica.
The operation will edit the entry of R[id ][ id ] in all the other replicas. The new value
will be the sum of n and the existing value of R[id ][ id ] .
– decrement
Decrement operation takes the same parameters as the increment operation with the
same prerequisites. The operation edits the entry of U[id] , replacing it with the sum
of n and the existing value of U[id] .
– transfer
Transfer operation is used to transfer credit between replicas. The parameters are:
∗ from - the replica from which the credit is transferred
∗ to - the replica to which the credit is transferred
RR n° 9111
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∗ n - the new value of the entry R[from][to] at the origin replica
The prerequisite for the operation is that the replica cannot transfer credit to itself
and from and to are participating replicas. The operation updates the entry at
R[from][to] with the sum of n and the existing value of R[from][to] .
This specification is run against the CEC tool. The tool shows precondition instability of
decrement operation with both decrement operation and transfer operation. The tool also gen-
erates the below token which shows that the operation pairs fail when they originate from the
same replica.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
decrement : decrement_param1
t r a n s f e r : transfer_param1
Token c o n f l i c t s :
decrement_param1 : decrement_param1 , transfer_param1
transfer_param1 : decrement_param1
Since the CISE logic assumes causal delivery in the underlying layer of the application spec-
ification, we can impose restrictions on the pair of operations to be generated from different
replicas.
3.4 Improved Decrement counter CRDT
A slight modification of the above counter can result in a design which does not require
explicit specification of causal delivery. We emulate the merge function provided in the state-
based specification of the bounded counter[8]: instead of performing the addition operations on
the elements of the matrix, we substitute them by the maximum of the current value and the
incoming value. The parameter of the operation is the resultant of the computation performed
in the local replica.
3.5 Replicated Growable Array
Replicated Growable Array(RGA) is a CRDT used in the context of collaborative editing [10].
It proposes a replicated data type for a linked list. Previous works have formally specified RGA
and a recent work proved that RGA is eventually consistent [11]. The proof is based on modeling
a network and specifying RGA on top of the model to show that given the network model, RGA
eventually converges. Instead, we use the CISE logic to prove RGA correct.
• Data structures and properties ListType represents a map of nodes. A node is repre-
sented by a type Ref . The fields of a node are:
– content , which contains the value of the node of type Object
– next , which points to the next node
– clock_ins , which is used to store the timestamp for insert operations
– clock_up , which stores the timestamp for update/delete operations
A variable is initiated, called list , which is of the data type ListType . presence is a
variable that helps in tracking the nodes added while using insert operations. Its type is
[Ref]bool .
We define a set of additional objects as follows:
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– tombstone of type Object , indicating that the object is deleted
– head of type Ref , indicating the start of the list
– tail of type Ref , indicating the end of the list
For each of these fields and special objects, we need to specify the properties. The property
of presence flag requires that if a node is present in the list, the next node which it points
to must also be present in the list. This ensures that a node already inserted does not
point to a node yet to be inserted to the list. For the head and tail nodes, we define the
properties as below:
– clock_ins and clock_up are set to 0
– content is set to a tombstone (indicating nothing)
– presence to true to show that they will be present in the list
For all nodes except the head and tail , the clock_ins and clock_up should have non-zero
values. The clock_ins and clock_up are meant to have information about the origin replica
and the time of the operation. Hence it is guaranteed that no two clock_ins or clock_up
would be equal.
The support functions and their functionalities are describes as follows:
– create_node creates a new node and returns it. The created node will neither be
a head nor the tail and the function will never return the same object if either the
content or the timestamp of the object differs.
– get_actual_reference returns the exact location where the insert operation can insert
a new node. The node to be inserted is to be placed to the right side of the base node
but after the nodes which are inserted later at the same place. The nodes inserted
later will have a greater value for the clock. Until it finds a node such that the next
of the node has a clock value lesser than the current operation clock value, it goes on
searching recursively.
– is_successor checks whether the parameters successor has a connection from the pa-
rameter base . This function is used to define the property of the list that the list
should start from the head and end in the tail.
The property that no two nodes have the same next has been specified to avoid circles in
the list and enforces the list to be linear.
• Invariants
The invariants of a linked list are only two :
– A head should be present
– A tail should be present
• Operations with pre and post conditions
The four operations are insert , update , delete and read . The following shows the pre
and post conditions of each operation along with the variables it modifies.
– insert
Insert operation takes three parameters
RR n° 9111
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∗ base - the node to the right of which the new value is to be inserted
∗ new - the value to be inserted
∗ time - the number indicating the origin replica and the timestamp of the operation
The preconditions for the operation are that:
∗ base is not a tail
∗ base is already present in the list
∗ new is not a tombstone
∗ the new node created using new and time is not the same as base and it is not
already present in the list
This operation modifies both the variables, list and presence . A new node is created
using new and time parameters and it is inserted to the right of the node which is
obtained by calling the get_actual_reference function. The next fields of the newly
created node and the reference node to the right of which it is addded to are modified
accordingly. For the new node created the presence flag is also set.
– update
Update operation takes three parameters
∗ base - the node to be updated
∗ obj - the new value
∗ time - the timestamp of the operation
The preconditions for the operation are that base is not a tail and base is already
present in the list . This operation modifies list by updating content of base node
to obj and updating clock_up . This modification happens only when clock_up of
the node is less than the operation timestamp, else it returns the same list without
any modifications.
– delete
Delete operation takes two parameters
∗ base - the node to be deleted
∗ time - the number indicating the origin replica and the timestamp of the operation
The preconditions for the operation are the same as that of the update operation.
The only difference between update and delete operations is that the content of the
base node is updated to a tombstone .
– read
Read operation takes only the node of which the value is to be returned, base , as the
input. The preconditions are similar to update and delete and it does not have any
impact on the list.
The tool is run with the specification input. The following are the issues pointed out by the
tool:
• insert - insert stability issue
• delete - update commutativity issue
• update - update commutativity issue
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The tokens generated by the solver is as follows:
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
update : update_param3
i n s e r t : insert_param3
de l e t e : delete_param2
Token c o n f l i c t s :
delete_param2 : update_param3
insert_param3 : insert_param3
update_param3 : delete_param2 , update_param3
The tokens indicated as in the same notation as we specified earlier. We know that no two
timestamps for a pair of operations would be equal. When we specify this restriction, the
verification succeeds.
4 Conclusion
The Correct Eventual Consistency (CEC) tool was used to specify some sample replicated
data structures. We showed how the tool captured the behaviours of different implementations
of a decrement counter and also the replicated growable array.
From the experience gained from the tool usage, we suggest the following improvements to the
tool (in decreasing order of the usefulness), categorized into sections:
• Debugging support
As of now, the tool gives information on the result of the test - pass or fail, along with an
error trace from boogie. For the user, who is not aware of the intermediate boogie files
generated by the tool, the error traces are not useful. To support the debugging experience,
we need to see how to provide useful information for each step of verification. The following
are the suggestions for each step:
– Specification correction
∗ Syntax check
Boogie check provides the exact position of the syntax issue in the input file. Since
the tool is reordering the format of the specification before sending it to Boogie,
it would be useful to remap the error position to the position in the specification
given by the user. This information is quite sufficient for identifying the issue.
∗ Safety check
A counter example can help to understand more about the issue which violates
the invariant. Further to that the invariant specified by the user can be broken
down and fed to the Z3 solver to narrow down what exactly caused the violation.
In some cases, strengthening the preconditions might be needed. The weakest
precondition calculus can be used to derive the weakest precondition. The derived
precondition needs to be a subset of the specified precondition. The precondition
might need further strengthening in some cases though.
∗ Anomaly check
This is the trickiest check to debug. This test is designed in a way that the test
fails if the boogie verification succeeds, thereby having no error trace and counter
model generated. This leads to a situation where the user cannot get a counter
example or any pointer to the failure. We have to devise an approach to find a




Completeness check fails when the user doesn’t specify all the components of
the variables modified in the procedure. If we can point out exactly the list of
components left out, it would be useful. The old and new values obtained from
the counter model can be used here to point out the components whose behavior
is to be specified.
– Consistency verification
∗ Opposition check
This checks whether the preconditions are disjoint sets. This is modeled in a
way similar to the anomaly check and hence it is difficult to have a support in
debugging.
∗ Stability check
The debugging support for this step can be modeled as the same in the case of
the safety check.
∗ Commutativity check
This step can borrow the ideas from the completeness check.
• Counter example comprehension
Once the verification fails, the previous step will allow the user to identify the category
of issue with the specification, like whether the individual safety test failed. Apart from
this, a counter example will also help the user to understand more about the issue with the
specification. For this, the feature of counter models which are generated by the SMT solve
Z3, can be used. As a first level information, the parameters of the failed operation along
with the values of the components in the invariant can be displayed. If the user wishes to
know the state of the global variables before and after the execution of the operation, that
can be provided as well. Boogie’s “CaptureState” functionality can help here.
• Experimentation platform
The idea is to host the tool as a service and collect usage logs. The platform can be used as
part of some coursework for the students to experiment application and/or data structure
specifications. The logs can be stored and examined offline. This will help in identifying
the bottlenecks in specification writing. It will also be useful later in studying the patterns
in specifications.
• Token generation
– The current token generation part takes a huge amount of time to suggest tokens,
especially when the number of parameters are more. This needs to be optimised. The
counter example generated from the previous step might be useful here to narrow
down the search space of the tokens.
– The token generator only generates tokens for inequality of parameters. It can be
made to handle other relations as well.
– The token generator suggests tokens by restricting the parameters. When the param-
eters are structured data types, this leads to a coarse locking, even if only a particular
component only needs to be taken into account. This can be extended to support
token generation in a finer level, considering the components of the structured data
types.
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• Easier specification
While writing the specification, the part which needed the most effort is the specification
of properties, especially when the data types of the variables are complex data structures.
If some support system is present to aid the programmers in guiding them to write the
correct minimal properties, it would make the tool easier to use. Some possible approaches
are:
– Generate specification (or the axioms of the specification) from the code and/or test
cases
– Provide a set of libraries for the usual special objects defined in the properties, such
as “null”.
– Identify different patterns for properties and provide reusable code snippets.
• Supporting state-based datatypes
The current version of the tool supports the specification in the form of operation-based
replicated data types. This can be extended to support the verification of state-based
replicated data types as well. The extended version needs to check whether
– Each operation including the merge is sequentially safe
– The precondition of merge is stable under itself
– merge is commutative
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const min : int ;
@var iab le s
var counter : int ;
var l o ck : Repl icaID ;
@invar iant
counter >= min ;
@operat ions
procedure increment ( r e p l i c a : ReplicaID , va lue : int )
modifies counter ;
requires value > 0 ;
ensures counter == old ( counter ) + value ;
procedure decrement ( r e p l i c a : ReplicaID , va lue : int )
modifies counter ;
requires value > 0 && ( counter >= value + min ) && lock == r e p l i c a ;




" operat ion1 " : "decrement" ,
" operat ion2 " : "decrement" ,










decrement OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
increment OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
FULL TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−LOGIC VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
decrement SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
increment SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
increment ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
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decrement COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
increment COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−RESTRICTIONS VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RESTRICTIONS WERE LOADED CORRECTLY
############## CONSISTENCY TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR OPPOSITION VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
decrement decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (FAILED)
increment increment OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR STABILITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
increment increment STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR COMMUTATIVITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
increment increment COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−EQUALITY SOLVER−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
Token c o n f l i c t s :




type Credit = int ;
type ReplicaID ;
@var iab le s
var l o c a lC r ed i t : [ Repl icaID ] Credi t ;
var g l oba lCr ed i t : Cred it ;
var l : Repl icaID ;
@equals [ Repl icaID ] Credi t @as f o ra l l r : Repl icaID : : @this [ r ] == @other [ r ] ;
@equals Credi t @as @this == @other ;
@invar iant
( f o ra l l r : Repl icaID : : l o c a lC r ed i t [ r ] >= 0) && ( g l oba lCr ed i t >= 0) ;
@operat ions
procedure acqu i r eCred i t ( r e p l i c a : ReplicaID , k : Cred i t )
modifies g loba lCred i t , l o c a lC r ed i t ;
requires k > 0 && g loba lCr ed i t >= k && l == r e p l i c a ;
ensures ( f o ra l l r : Repl icaID : : ( r == r e p l i c a ==> l o c a lC r ed i t [ r ] == old ( l o c a lC r ed i t
) [ r ] + k ) && ( r != r e p l i c a ==> l o c a lC r e d i t [ r ] == old ( l o c a lC r ed i t ) [ r ] ) ) &&
g loba lCr ed i t == old ( g l oba lCr ed i t ) − k ;
procedure r e l e a s eC r ed i t ( r e p l i c a : ReplicaID , k : Cred i t )
modifies g loba lCred i t , l o c a lC r ed i t ;
requires k > 0 && l o c a lC r e d i t [ r e p l i c a ] >= k ;
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ensures ( f o ra l l r : Repl icaID : : ( r == r e p l i c a ==> l o c a lC r ed i t [ r ] == old ( l o c a lC r ed i t
) [ r ] − k ) && ( r != r e p l i c a ==> l o c a lC r ed i t [ r ] == old ( l o c a lC r ed i t ) [ r ] ) ) &&
g loba lCr ed i t == old ( g l oba lCr ed i t ) + k ;
procedure increment ( r e p l i c a : ReplicaID , k : Cred i t )
modifies l o c a lC r ed i t ;
requires k > 0 ;
ensures fora l l r : Repl icaID : : ( r == r e p l i c a ==> l o c a lC r e d i t [ r ] == old ( l o c a lC r ed i t )
[ r ] + k ) && ( r != r e p l i c a ==> l o c a lC r ed i t [ r ] == old ( l o c a lC r ed i t ) [ r ] ) ;
procedure decrement ( r e p l i c a : ReplicaID , k : Cred it )
modifies l o c a lC r ed i t ;
requires k > 0 && l o c a lC r e d i t [ r e p l i c a ] >= k ;
ensures fora l l r : Repl icaID : : ( r == r e p l i c a ==> l o c a lC r e d i t [ r ] == old ( l o c a lC r ed i t )




" operat ion1 " : " r e l e a s eC r ed i t " ,
" operat ion2 " : " r e l e a s eC r ed i t " ,
" r e s t r i c t i o n s " : [ "@1 != @3" ]
} ,
{
" operat ion1 " : "decrement" ,
" operat ion2 " : "decrement" ,
" r e s t r i c t i o n s " : [ "@1 != @3" ]
} ,
{
" operat ion1 " : " acqu i r eCred i t " ,
" operat ion2 " : " acqu i r eCred i t " ,
" r e s t r i c t i o n s " : [ "@1 != @3" ]
} ,
{
" operat ion1 " : " r e l e a s eC r ed i t " ,
" operat ion2 " : "decrement" ,










decrement OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
increment OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
FULL TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−LOGIC VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
decrement SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
increment SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
RR n° 9111
18 Sreeja
decrement ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
increment ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
decrement COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
increment COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−RESTRICTIONS VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RESTRICTIONS WERE LOADED CORRECTLY
############## CONSISTENCY TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR OPPOSITION VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
r e l e a s eC r ed i t r e l e a s eC r ed i t OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
decrement decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t a cqu i r eCred i t OPPOSITION TEST: (FAILED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t r e l e a s eC r ed i t OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t increment OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t increment OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment increment OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR STABILITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
r e l e a s eC r ed i t r e l e a s eC r ed i t STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t r e l e a s eC r ed i t STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t increment STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t increment STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment increment STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR COMMUTATIVITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
r e l e a s eC r ed i t r e l e a s eC r ed i t COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t r e l e a s eC r ed i t COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t increment COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
acqu i r eCred i t decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
r e l e a s eC r ed i t increment COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment increment COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−EQUALITY SOLVER−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
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@init
type matrix2d=[ int , int ] int ;
type matrix1d=[ int ] int ;
const r e p l i c a s : int ;
const min : int ;
axiom( f o ra l l r : int , U: matrix1d : : r >= 0 && r <= r e p l i c a s ==> U[ r ] >= 0) ;
axiom( f o ra l l r1 , r2 : int , R: matrix2d : : r1 >= 0 && r1 <= r e p l i c a s && r2 >= 0 && r2
<= r e p l i c a s ==> R[ r1 , r2 ] >= 0) ;
axiom( r e p l i c a s > 0 && r e p l i c a s < 99) ;
function value (R: matrix2d , U: matrix1d ) returns ( int )
{
min + diagonal_sum (R, 0) + sum(U, 0)
}
function diagonal_sum (R: matrix2d , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index < r e p l i c a s then (R[ index , index ] + diagonal_sum (R, index + 1) ) else (0 )
}
function sum(U: matrix1d , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index < r e p l i c a s then (U[ index ] + sum(U, index + 1) ) else (0 )
}
function l o c a l_ r i gh t s ( id : int , R: matrix2d , U: matrix1d ) returns ( int )
{
R[ id , id ] + column_sum(R, id , 0) − row_sum(R, id , 0) − U[ id ]
}
function column_sum(R: matrix2d , c o l : int , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index > r e p l i c a s then (R[ index , c o l ] + column_sum(R, co l , index + 1) ) else (0 )
}
function row_sum(R: matrix2d , row : int , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index > r e p l i c a s then (R[ row , index ] + row_sum(R, row , index + 1) ) else (0 )
}
function i nc rement_e f f ec t (R: matrix2d , oldR : matrix2d , id : int , n : int ) returns (bool )
{
( f o ra l l r1 , r2 : int : : ( ( r1 == id && r2 == id ) ==> R[ r1 , r2 ] == oldR [ r1 , r2 ] + n)
&& ( ( r1 != id | | r2 != id ) ==> R[ r1 , r2 ] == oldR [ r1 , r2 ] ) )
}
function decrement_ef fect (U: matrix1d , oldU : matrix1d , id : int , n : int ) returns (bool )
{
( f o ra l l r : int : : ( r == id ==> U[ r ] == oldU [ r ] + n) && ( r != id ==> U[ r ] == oldU [
r ] ) )
}
function t r a n s f e r_ e f f e c t (R: matrix2d , oldR : matrix2d , from : int , to : int , n : int )
returns (bool )
{
( f o ra l l r1 , r2 : int : : ( ( r1 == from && r2 == to ) ==> R[ r1 , r2 ] == oldR [ r1 , r2 ] + n)
&& ( ( r1 != from | | r2 != to ) ==> R[ r1 , r2 ] == oldR [ r1 , r2 ] ) )
}
@var iab le s
var R: matrix2d ;
var U: matrix1d ;
@equals matrix2d @as f o ra l l r1 , r2 : int : : @this [ r1 , r2 ] == @other [ r1 , r2 ] ;
@equals matrix1d @as f o ra l l r : int : : @this [ r ] == @other [ r ] ;
@invar iant




procedure increment ( id : int , n : int )
modifies R;
requires n > 0 && id >= 0 && id < r e p l i c a s ;
ensures i nc rement_e f f ec t (R, old (R) , id , n ) ;
procedure decrement ( id : int , n : int )
modifies U;
requires n > 0 && id >= 0 && id < r e p l i c a s && lo c a l_ r i gh t s ( id , R, U) >= n ;
ensures decrement_ef fect (U, old (U) , id , n ) ;
procedure t r a n s f e r ( from : int , to : int , n : int )
modifies R;
requires n > 0 && from >= 0 && from < r e p l i c a s && to >= 0 && to < r e p l i c a s &&
from != to && lo c a l_ r i gh t s ( from , R, U) >= n ;




" operat ion1 " : "decrement" ,
" operat ion2 " : "decrement" ,
" r e s t r i c t i o n s " : [ "@1 != @3" ]
} ,
{
" operat ion1 " : "decrement" ,
" operat ion2 " : " t r a n s f e r " ,










increment OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
decrement OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
FULL TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−LOGIC VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
increment SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
increment ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
decrement ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
increment COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
decrement COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−RESTRICTIONS VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
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RESTRICTIONS WERE LOADED CORRECTLY
############## CONSISTENCY TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR OPPOSITION VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
decrement decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
decrement t r a n s f e r OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment increment OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment t r a n s f e r OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r t r a n s f e r OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR STABILITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
decrement decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement t r a n s f e r STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment increment STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment t r a n s f e r STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r t r a n s f e r STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR COMMUTATIVITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
decrement decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement t r a n s f e r COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment increment COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment t r a n s f e r COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r t r a n s f e r COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−EQUALITY SOLVER−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
Token c o n f l i c t s :




type matrix2d=[ int ] [ int ] int ;
type matrix1d=[ int ] int ;
const r e p l i c a s : int ;
const min : int ;
axiom( f o ra l l r : int , U: matrix1d : : r >= 0 && r < r e p l i c a s ==> U[ r ] >= 0) ;
axiom( f o ra l l r1 , r2 : int , R: matrix2d : : r1 >= 0 && r1 < r e p l i c a s && r2 >= 0 && r2 <
r e p l i c a s ==> R[ r1 ] [ r2 ] >= 0) ;
axiom( r e p l i c a s > 0 && r e p l i c a s < 99) ;
function value (R: matrix2d , U: matrix1d ) returns ( int )
{
min + diagonal_sum (R, 0) + sum(U, 0)
}
function diagonal_sum (R: matrix2d , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index < r e p l i c a s then (R[ index ] [ index ] + diagonal_sum (R, index + 1) ) else (0 )
1The replicas are bounded between 0 and 99, since Boogie gives a verification failure for replicas more than




function sum(U: matrix1d , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index < r e p l i c a s then (U[ index ] + sum(U, index + 1) ) else (0 )
}
function l o c a l_ r i gh t s ( id : int , R: matrix2d , U: matrix1d ) returns ( int )
{
R[ id ] [ id ] + column_sum(R, id , 0) − row_sum(R, id , 0) − U[ id ]
}
function column_sum(R: matrix2d , c o l : int , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index > r e p l i c a s then (R[ index ] [ c o l ] + column_sum(R, co l , index + 1) ) else
(0 )
}
function row_sum(R: matrix2d , row : int , index : int ) returns ( int )
{
i f index > r e p l i c a s then (R[ row ] [ index ] + row_sum(R, row , index + 1) ) else (0 )
}
function edit_matrix2d (R: matrix2d , oldR : matrix2d , row : int , column : int , va lue : int )
returns (bool )
{
( f o ra l l r , c : int : : ( ( r == row && c == column ) ==> R[ r ] [ c ] == max( value , oldR [ r
] [ c ] ) ) && ( ( r != row | | c != column ) ==> R[ r ] [ c ] == oldR [ r ] [ c ] ) )
}
function edit_matrix1d (U: matrix1d , oldU : matrix1d , id : int , va lue : int ) returns (bool )
{
( f o ra l l r : int : : ( r == id ==> U[ r ] == max( value , oldU [ r ] ) ) && ( r != id ==> U[ r ]
== oldU [ r ] ) )
}
function max( a : int , b : int ) returns ( int )
{
( i f a > b then a else b)
}
@var iab le s
var R: matrix2d ;
var U: matrix1d ;
@equals matrix2d @as f o ra l l r1 , r2 : int : : @this [ r1 ] [ r2 ] == @other [ r1 ] [ r2 ] ;
@equals matrix1d @as f o ra l l r : int : : @this [ r ] == @other [ r ] ;
@invar iant
va lue (R, U) >= min ;
@operat ions
procedure increment ( id : int , n : int )
modifies R;
requires id >= 0 && id < r e p l i c a s ;
ensures edit_matrix2d (R, old (R) , id , id , n ) ;
procedure decrement ( id : int , n : int )
modifies U;
requires id >= 0 && id < r e p l i c a s ;
ensures edit_matrix1d (U, old (U) , id , n ) ;
procedure t r a n s f e r ( from : int , to : int , n : int )
modifies R;
requires from >= 0 && from < r e p l i c a s && to >= 0 && to < r e p l i c a s && from != to ;
ensures edit_matrix2d (R, old (R) , from , to , n ) ;
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Token
There are no tokens required for this specification.
Result






increment OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
decrement OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
FULL TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−LOGIC VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
increment SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
increment ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
decrement ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
increment COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
decrement COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
############## CONSISTENCY TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR OPPOSITION VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
increment increment OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
increment t r a n s f e r OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
decrement decrement OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
decrement t r a n s f e r OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r t r a n s f e r OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR STABILITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
increment increment STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment t r a n s f e r STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement decrement STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement t r a n s f e r STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r t r a n s f e r STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR COMMUTATIVITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
increment increment COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
increment t r a n s f e r COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement decrement COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
decrement t r a n s f e r COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
t r a n s f e r t r a n s f e r COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−EQUALITY SOLVER−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
RR n° 9111
24 Sreeja
Token c o n f l i c t s :






type Fie ld a ;
type ListType = [ Ref ]<a>[ F i e ld a ] a ;
type Flag = [ Ref ] bool ;
const unique content : F i e ld Object ;
const unique next : F i e ld Ref ;
const unique c lock_ins : F i e ld int ;
const unique clock_up : F i e ld int ;
const tombstone : Object ;
const head : Ref ;
const t a i l : Ref ;
function create_node ( obj : Object , time : int ) returns ( r e s u l t : Ref ) ;
function get_actua l_re fe rence ( l i s t : ListType , base : Ref , time : int ) returns ( r e s u l t :
Ref )
{
i f ( l i s t [ l i s t [ base ] [ next ] ] [ c lock_ins ] < time ) then ( base ) else (
get_actua l_re fe rence ( l i s t , l i s t [ base ] [ next ] , time ) )
}
function i s_succ e s s o r ( l i s t : ListType , base : Ref , s u c c e s s o r : Ref ) returns ( r e s u l t : bool
)
{
l i s t [ base ] [ next ] == suc c e s s o r | | i s_succ e s s o r ( l i s t , l i s t [ base ] [ next ] , s u c c e s s o r )
}
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , pre sence : Flag , r : Ref : : p re sence [ r ] == presence [ l i s t [
r ] [ next ] ] ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , pre sence : Flag : : l i s t [ t a i l ] [ content ] == tombstone &&
l i s t [ t a i l ] [ c lock_ins ] == 0 && l i s t [ t a i l ] [ clock_up ] == 0 && l i s t [ t a i l ] [ next ] ==
t a i l && presence [ t a i l ] == true ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , pre sence : Flag : : l i s t [ head ] [ content ] == tombstone &&
l i s t [ head ] [ c lock_ins ] == 0 && l i s t [ head ] [ clock_up ] == 0 && presence [ head ] ==
true ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , pre sence : Flag , r : Ref : : r != t a i l && r != head &&
presence [ r ] == true ==> l i s t [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] > 0 && l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] > 0) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , r1 , r2 : Ref : : r1 != head && r2 != head && r1 != t a i l
&& r2 != t a i l && r1 != r2 ==> l i s t [ r1 ] [ clock_up ] != l i s t [ r2 ] [ clock_up ] && l i s t
[ r1 ] [ c lock_ins ] != l i s t [ r2 ] [ c lock_ins ] ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l obj1 , obj2 : Object , time1 , time2 : int : : ( obj1 != obj2 | | time1 !=
time2 ==> create_node ( obj1 , time1 ) != create_node ( obj2 , time2 ) ) && ( obj1 ==
obj2 && time1 == time2 ==> create_node ( obj1 , time1 ) == create_node ( obj2 , time2
) ) ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l obj : Object , time : int : : create_node ( obj , time ) != head &&
create_node ( obj , time ) != t a i l ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , pre sence : Flag , r1 , r2 : Ref : : r1 != t a i l && r2 != t a i l
&& r1 != r2 && presence [ r1 ] == true && presence [ r2 ] == true ==> l i s t [ r1 ] [ next ]
!= l i s t [ r2 ] [ next ] ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , pre sence : Flag , r : Ref : : p re sence [ r ] == true ==>
is_succ e s s o r ( l i s t , r , t a i l ) ) ;
axiom ( f o ra l l l i s t : ListType , pre sence : Flag , r : Ref : : p re sence [ r ] == true ==>
is_succ e s s o r ( l i s t , head , r ) ) ;
@var iab le s
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var l i s t : ListType ;
var presence : Flag ;
@equals ListType @as f o ra l l r : Ref : : @this [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] == @other [ r ] [ c lock_ins ]
&& @this [ r ] [ clock_up ] == @other [ r ] [ clock_up ] && @this [ r ] [ content ] == @other [ r
] [ content ] && @this [ r ] [ next ] == @other [ r ] [ next ] ;
@equals Flag @as f o ra l l r : Ref : : @this [ r ] == @other [ r ] ;
@invar iant
( exists r : Ref : : p re sence [ r ] == true && l i s t [ head ] [ next ] == r ) && ( exists r : Ref : :
p re sence [ r ] == true && l i s t [ r ] [ next ] == t a i l ) ;
@operat ions
procedure de l e t e ( base : Ref , time : int )
modifies l i s t ;
requires ( base != t a i l ) && ( presence [ base ] == true ) ;
ensures ( f o ra l l r : Ref : : ( r == base && old ( l i s t ) [ base ] [ clock_up ] < time ==>
l i s t [ r ] [ content ] == tombstone && l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] == time ) && ( r != base
| | old ( l i s t ) [ base ] [ clock_up ] >= time ==> l i s t [ r ] [ content ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [
content ] && l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ clock_up ] ) && l i s t [ r
] [ next ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ next ] && l i s t [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [
c lock_ins ] ) ;
procedure update ( base : Ref , obj : Object , time : int )
modifies l i s t ;
requires ( base != t a i l ) && ( presence [ base ] == true ) ;
ensures ( f o ra l l r : Ref : : ( r == base && old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ clock_up ] < time ==> l i s t [
r ] [ content ] == obj && l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] == time ) && ( r != base | | old ( l i s t
) [ r ] [ clock_up ] >= time ==> l i s t [ r ] [ content ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ content ] &&
l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ clock_up ] ) && l i s t [ r ] [ next ] ==
old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ next ] && l i s t [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] ) ;
procedure read ( base : Ref )
requires ( base != t a i l ) && ( presence [ base ] == true ) ;
procedure i n s e r t ( base : Ref , new : Object , time : int )
modifies l i s t , p re sence ;
requires ( base != t a i l ) && ( presence [ base ] == true ) && (new != tombstone ) && (
presence [ create_node (new , time ) ] == fa l se ) && ( create_node (new , time ) !=
base ) ;
ensures ( f o ra l l r : Ref : : ( r == get_actua l_re fe rence (old ( l i s t ) , base , time ) ==>
l i s t [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] && l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] == old
( l i s t ) [ r ] [ clock_up ] && l i s t [ r ] [ next ] == create_node (new , time ) && l i s t [ r ] [
content ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ content ] ) && ( r == create_node (new , time ) ==>
l i s t [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] == time && l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] == time && l i s t [ r ] [ next ]
== old ( l i s t ) [ ge t_actua l_re fe rence (old ( l i s t ) , base , time ) ] [ next ] && l i s t [ r
] [ content ] == new) && ( r != get_actua l_re fe rence (old ( l i s t ) , base , time ) &&
r != create_node (new , time ) ==> l i s t [ r ] [ c lock_ins ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [
c lock_ins ] && l i s t [ r ] [ clock_up ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ clock_up ] && l i s t [ r ] [ next ]
== old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ next ] && l i s t [ r ] [ content ] == old ( l i s t ) [ r ] [ content ] ) ) && (
f o ra l l r : Ref : : ( r == create_node (new , time ) ==> presence [ r ] == true ) && (




" operat ion1 " : "update" ,
" operat ion2 " : "update" ,





" operat ion1 " : " i n s e r t " ,
" operat ion2 " : " i n s e r t " ,
" r e s t r i c t i o n s " : [ "@3 != @6" ]
} ,
{
" operat ion1 " : " d e l e t e " ,
" operat ion2 " : "update" ,










i n s e r t OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
read OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
update OPERATION TEST: (PASSED)
FULL TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−LOGIC VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
i n s e r t SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
read SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
update SAFETY TEST: (PASSED)
i n s e r t ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
read ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
update ABSURD TEST: (PASSED)
i n s e r t COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
read COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
update COMPLETENESS TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−RESTRICTIONS VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
RESTRICTIONS WERE LOADED CORRECTLY
############## CONSISTENCY TESTS ##############
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR OPPOSITION VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
update update OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
i n s e r t i n s e r t OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e update OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e d e l e t e OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e read OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e i n s e r t OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
update read OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
update i n s e r t OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
read read OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
read i n s e r t OPPOSITION TEST: (PASSED)
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−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR STABILITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
update update STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
i n s e r t i n s e r t STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e update STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e d e l e t e STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e read STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e i n s e r t STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
update read STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
update i n s e r t STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
read read STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
read i n s e r t STABILITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−PAIR COMMUTATIVITY VERIFICATION−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
update update COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
i n s e r t i n s e r t COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e update COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e d e l e t e COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e read COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
d e l e t e i n s e r t COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
update read COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
update i n s e r t COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
read read COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
read i n s e r t COMMUTATIVITY TEST: (PASSED)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−EQUALITY SOLVER−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−TOKEN MODEL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Tokens per ope ra t i on s :
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